In part 1, we looked at some of the cockroach situations which emerged in 2025, risks associated with receivables finance, and some of the complexities for securitisation investors facing servicer insolvency. In part 2, we’re going to look at how lenders can fight fraud, and the fallout of the year of the cockroaches.
Roach killers
Because receivables fraud is a known risk, there are some established defences.
“The first line of defence is the people,” said Igor Zaks, CEO of Tenzor, an advisory and due diligence firm specialising in working capital financing and corporate distress. “If the people you’re facing raise red flags, you don’t even get to the part where you’re talking terms.”
Stenn founder Greg Karpovsky’s previous receivables finance firm collapsed amid fraud allegations (after he had left). Facts remain murky, but a lawsuit from HBK Investments, a Dallas hedge fund, called it “an enormous fraud” and said that “many of its clients were fictitious”. It is, at the least, an argument for enhanced due diligence on the way in.
A case in 2009, filed by Fortress Value Recovery Fund alleged that Patrick James, founder of First Brands, “created this web of companies to transfer funds from Columbus Components to management companies, such as Hawthorn Manufacturing and CCG Holdings, in an attempt to defraud Columbus Component’s creditors”.
The case was settled, but First Brands’ current creditors may be wishing they’d run a couple of name searches on the US’s PACER legal database.
The next lines of defence are more involved. The core mechanic in verifying receivables still involves contacting the payables departments, but there are third parties specialising in this work, and other tools involved that can flag suspicious situations.
History can help — if a firm usually sells 10k a month to a customer and puts in an invoice for 500k, it could be worth examining more closely. If a lender can access comprehensive bank records it can match receivables factored to actual cashflows, but this is harder than it sounds when all parties have multiple entities, multiple bank accounts, and potentially multiple receivables finance or factoring responsibilities.
Gold standard security for a receivables-based lender involves the lender or lending vehicles having direct control over collection accounts, but this is also harder than it might seem. Collecting on invoices is often deeply enmeshed in the ordinary COB cashflows around a corporate structure, and difficult to perfectly segregate.
A well-structured corporate receivables facility has to manage cashflows extremely carefully — lenders need security over the relevant corporate bank accounts, but deal structures can’t allow cash to be moved in and out of a securitisation vehicle at will, as though the securitisation-linked accounts were just another corporate bank account.
Rithm Capital has a thorough analysis of some of the tools available to control collateral — and what went wrong in First Brands and Tricolor. It cites three key safeguards in “well-controlled” structures — deposit account control agreements (a secured party can control the deposit account), customer payment notifications (the customer should be notified when a receivable is assigned to a facility) and invoice-level identification and duplication controls.
The paper notes: “Because First Brands acted as its own servicer — collecting customer payments, applying cash internally and remitting to various facilities — the integrity of the structure relied heavily on internal controls and reporting”.
Rithm outlines what it calls a “portable control stack” across different forms of asset-based financing, looking at enforcement mechanics, cashflow control, servicing oversight, continuous verification and bankruptcy-remote transfer mechanics. It applies differently to mortgages, auto loans, consumer loans and receivables finance, but the aim is segregate and verify assets, and ensure that enforcement and lender control is maintained.
“First Brands and Tricolor were not failures of exotic instruments. Both involved familiar asset types and credit structures,” says the paper. “The core lesson is that legal form — secured, self-liquidating, asset-based — does not guarantee outcome if lenders do not build and maintain operational control over the ownership, cash flows and verification of their collateral.”
In hot markets, protective provisions can easily be pushed aside. A lender can win a potentially lucrative deal by being easiest to deal with; the counterparty that keeps asking awkward questions and wanting to implement extra procedures can be ignored in favour of someone more “commercial”.
For a corporate borrower, receivables finance also has to compete against the terms on offer from other financing products.
Banks or private credit firms doing ordinary cashflow lending will not ask for access to bank accounts or direct verification of customer relationships; covenants will be light-touch, easily waived and financial transparency limited. Top tier sponsors ask their lenders to agree to annual lender calls only, and frequently receive assent; push too hard on disclosure and verification and the deal goes away entirely.
“There are so many features you can put in these structures,” said a lawyer. “but ultimately the bank that is most accomodating and gives most flexibility will be most attractive, and it can become a race to the bottom. Banks don’t want to offside of where market practice is.”
Fallout
With the losses from these situations reverberating around investment banks, what’s the effect?
Writeoffs of less than $200m aren’t going to destabilise the likes of Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citi or JP Morgan, but they’re big enough to smoke 2025’s budgeted P&L for the business lines concerned.
Control functions often overcorrect following major losses or scandal — after BNP Paribas was fined $9bn for sanctions violations in 2014, it became allergic, for a time, to anything with a whiff of political risk. Barclays’ expensive structured notes screwup rebounded far beyond its structured notes division.
The cast of cockroach-exposed banks and credit funds is long.
Stenn was financed by Natixis, HSBC, Citi, and BNP Paribas, when it went down (others had a lucky escape). Tricolor was primarily warehoused by JP Morgan, Barclays and Fifth Third, joined by Origin Bank (me neither), with a variety of bond funds in the public ABS. Prax’s facility was arranged by HSBC, and lenders included Citi, JP Morgan, Royal Bank of Canada and NordLB.
First Brands was financed largely through private credit firms, including AB CarVal, or bank-aligned hedge funds such as Jefferies’ Point Bonita. Waterfall Asset Management was a mezz lender to Tricolor; Centerbridge was majority equity (worthless) in Stenn.
This extensive cast should give unaffected lenders pause for thought.
It’s possible that all of these firms shared some common deficiency in due diligence, but far more likely that they all operated roughly at market standards, and these market standards were insufficient to stop determined bad actors perpetrating first party fraud.
Most of the larger funds and banks affected have not shown an overall reduction in securitisation risk appetite (or not one discernable by competitors), but there’s a lot of nuance to that.
Banks which liked the risk-adjusted return profile of senior private securitisation lending still liked it afterwards, perhaps even more so, as banks which can suffered big losses tried to make good their annual budget by signing new lending.
But the business lines in a securitised products group are extremely diverse. Even managers who subscribe to the theory that more cockroaches may come out might see little reason to draw a line from receivables financing to other products.
Why should a loss on receivables mean a reduced advance rate for BNPL receivables, a higher spread on buy-to-let mortgages, or tighter terms on CRE back-leverage? For some institutions, it has led to a reduction in overall appetite for startup non-bank trade finance facilities, even if they have kept their foot to the gas in securitised products more broadly.
But they have been reviewing the situation. Before the cockroach reference, Jamie Dimon said: “You should assume that whenever something like that happens we scour all process, all procedures, all underwriting, all everything, and we think we're okay in other stuff.”
Barclays added a slide in its Q3 numbers on its private credit exposures, but said that it had reviewed its loan book, looking at whether a company is financially stretched, the strength of financial controls, and the independence of financial controls.
KKR was keen to emphasise it had no exposure to First Brands or Tricolor, and that these were not problems of private credit, but still “the first thing we do is reexamine our own book, look for any similar risks, and make sure our process holds up”
Whether all of these reviews would have have unmasked similar fraud situations is an open question. This relies on going beyond the servicer as source of truth — many securitisation deals, have a verification agent role, whose job is not, as you might expect, to verify collateral exists, but to check a provided collateral list against another provided collateral list.
Gatekeeping
Industry professionals say they haven’t seen a major change in the kinds of guardrails demanded by banks for new receivables facilities — but perhaps there have been no potential frauds trying to enter the market.
Most trade receivables securitisations continue to be provided to large corporate clients as part of a broader corporate relationship; whatever you think about the credit quality of say, Ineos or Virgin Media, these are substantial firms with real and legitimate businesses. Indeed, market participants report a minor flight to quality; legitimate corporates are seeing more interest than ever in financing their working capital.
For fintechs, it’s a different story. “A lot of investors in fintech platforms are applying a much higher level of diligence to the equity and sponsors behind these platforms,” said the lawyer.
It’s impossible to see how many potential frauds, though, have been stopped at the gates, before ever procuring institutional funding, let alone the billions vaporised this year.
“Every financier in the receivables industry has tales of fraud attempts that were stopped at the gates,” said Zaks. “But some will always get through. If you have a good burglar alarm, it won’t stop a burglar that’s determined to get in. But it might make them think about targeting your neighbour’s house that doesn’t have such a good alarm.”
Strong due diligence at the beginning, though, is not enough. Frauds don’t always start as frauds, and they are rarely complete frauds. In a revolving receivables deal, there must be enough cashflow coming off the real receivables to pay coupons.
“Frauds are rarely complete frauds,” said a market participant. “More commonly they are companies with a legitimate business which start to cut corners, and then cut more corners, and double down, hoping to plug a hole. Their second facility might finance assets they can’t fit into the first; they’re more established and can ask for more flexibility.”
Audit mechanics can help, but these don’t necessarily involve a detailed collateral review. An auditor, like a lender, often relies primarily on information provided by the servicer or originator of assets. The detailed questions — such as who provides the list of which loans are subject to spot checks — really matter.
Technology can help, and there are multiple tech firms looking to provide relevant services.
Technology platforms can allow customers to confirm invoices seamlessly — 40Seas for example — other technology solutions help analyse this data, and still others help lenders shine a light into corporate accounting, surfacing problems earlier.
One such example is Validis, which hooks corporate accounting systems to lenders and auditors in standardised format.
It said it had: “helped a larger international lender identify a million-dollar fraud. The borrower was inflating its receivables book and month-end to increase the facility size. Just looking at the receivables there were some red flags: large numbers, posted at weekends, not by the normal bookkeeper. When this was compared to the general ledger and balance sheet it was clear the books weren’t balancing. The borrower was able to identify the fraud early and recover most of its capital.”
Waves of blockchain hype have also broken over the industry, and several platforms are still working on blockchain solutions — IBM’s we.trade, which is focused on cross-border trade or a fully decentralized version like Populous, which sells invoices directly to investors and is enforced with smart contracts.
While these have potential, adoption can still be a long journey. Validis said that around half of its customers have no issue granting access to its platform, and the vast bulk of the others can get over the line once questions on privacy and data security are addressed.
The industry is also banding together — the US Structured Finance Association launched a “Fraud Mitigation Task Force” in October, while the Association for Financial Markets in Europe has formed a similar body. These aren’t going to prevent frauds directly, but sharing best practices on deal documentation and structure ought to help — there is no standard receivables document like the LMA or LSTA docs in corporate lending — and these forums also allow lenders to discuss the best ways to respond to these frauds.
While solutions might exist, nobody contacted for this article thinks the cockroach wave is over.
“What I fear we’ll see is more stones turned over and more situations discovered, going beyond the receivables world,” said the lawyer.





