Debtflix – 2024 European Restructuring Data Review
- Varun Gianchandani
- +Emmet Mc Nally
Alongside this report, we have compiled a comprehensive slide deck. While this article highlights the key insights, the slide deck (available for download in PowerPoint format) provides a deeper dive into the data and analysis.
This marks the first edition of our deep dive into the data behind European restructuring deals from the past year. We have broken down the 43 completed restructuring transactions available on the 9fin restructuring database (note: some additional 2025 and pre-2024 deals included in the link) into various categories to provide a comprehensive view of the key trends shaping the market.
The report highlights restructuring activity by country and identifies the most active sectors. We examine the volume of sponsored restructurings to restructurings of companies with other ownership types, and look at the score card of prior restructurings by analysing the number of repeat restructurings. From there, we explore the underlying causes of distress before drilling deeper into the specific reasons behind each trigger.
We then shift focus to the types of transaction structures deployed across these deals, analysing how the nature of the trigger influenced the transaction construct. We also assess situations where new money was infused, the instruments through which that new money was provided, and who provided it.
We analyse the time between advisor appointments and deal announcement, as well as the gap between the earliest debt maturities and the deal announcement, providing insights into how close to the edge companies are willing to operate before formally launching their restructurings. Finally, we wrap it up with analysing the choices for implementation routes.
Taken together, these themes not only define the restructuring landscape of 2024 but also offer early signals as to how market dynamics and restructuring strategies may evolve in 2025 and beyond.
Let’s dive in.
What happened in 2024?
We had our hands full in 2024 —deal volume rose from 2023 and 2022. While more restructurings were done, a significant number remained in progress. In total, 43 deals closed in 2024, representing €78.5bn-equivalent in pre-restructuring gross debt value.
2024 was the year Europe’s restructuring market was dominated by mammoth capital structures and market-moving sagas. Altice France and Ardagh grabbed headlines and market attention.
But it wasn’t just the size of the deals that stood out. 2024 also marked the arrival of aggressive US-style tactics on European soil. We saw the emergence of non-pro rata LMEs, with Dutch release liner manufacturer Loparex firing the starting pistol, and a wave of creditor co-ops forming to push back on aggressive tactics. The first co-op to emerge in Europe was among the senior creditors of Altice France.
Repetition is the key to mastery, not only in the US but also increasingly in Europe. Nine of the 43 deals in 2024 were repeat restructurings – i.e. the company underwent a previous restructuring within the last 10 years.
As expected, Germany and France stood out. Germany led the way in terms of deal count with 11 restructurings, driven largely by its troubled real estate sector which accounted for nearly half of them.
France, on the other hand, took the crown for largest total deal value with €27.1bn in completed restructurings (based on pre-restructuring gross debt). The bulk of this was driven by three mega deals - Emeis Group (formerly Orpea), Groupe Casino and Atos - underscoring France’s reputation for hosting some of the year’s most complex and sizeable capital structures.
The materials sector recorded the highest number of deals in 2024 with nine, as packaging and chemicals companies faced input cost pressures. The chemicals sub-sector, in particular, was hit hard by the now-infamous destocking wave, which further strained balance sheets and triggered a wave of restructurings.
Other active sectors from a restructuring perspective included real estate, industrials, and communication services — each recording six deals. However, consumer staples registered the largest aggregated deal value (€14.7bn) with just four deals – Groupe Casino (€6.9bn), Stonegate Pubs (€4.2bn), Rallye (€3.2bn), and Accolade Wines (€500m).
Restructuring triggers
We have identified what triggered each company’s restructuring on a subjective basis. We categorised the 43 deals into one of three buckets: maturity-driven, liquidity-driven, or ‘other’.
Of the 43 deals, 24 were maturity-driven, 13 were triggered by liquidity issues, and six fell under other triggers.
Here’s how we define each category:
- Maturity trigger: these companies were already facing deteriorating fundamentals and weakening financial performance. As their maturity walls approached, they were unable to refinance their obligations forcing them into restructuring.
- Liquidity trigger: in these cases, the company faced a cash crunch well before any major maturities. Restructuring was often prompted by sustained cash burn and limited access to funding sources.
- Other triggers: these restructurings were not driven by near-term maturities or liquidity constraints. Instead, they stemmed from strategic repositioning, legal complications, or other company-specific issues.
Liquidity triggers
Breaking down the 13 liquidity-triggered cases, the chart below highlights the specific circumstances that led these companies to run out of cash well before upcoming maturities.
In the materials sector, five companies restructured due to liquidity pressures (slide 12 of the deck). In three out of five cases, the driving factors were weak demand and elevated cost pressures.
Restructurings driven by structural decline include Tele Columbus, a fibre network and cable operator, and Vue, a cinema operator. Vue’s liquidity stress is attributed to an industry-wide disruption caused by a six-month strike, following labour disputes between Hollywood studios and writers’ and actors’ unions.
GenesisCare’s expansion into the US and Enviva’s capacity build-out were the key reasons for their inclusion in the capex/expansion category.
Swedish airline SAS Group and gaming operator Codere experienced liquidity stress due to pandemic-related pressures. SAS filed for Chapter 11 in 2022 and completed its reorganisation in 2024.
Maturity triggers
We have broken down maturity-triggered restructurings by industry (slide 16 of the deck) with real estate leading the pack with five deal. The more striking observation, however, is timing.
75% of these companies (18 out of 24) announced their restructurings within 12 months of their nearest maturity. ‘Announcement’ here refers to either the notification of a lock-up agreement or the public disclosure of proposed restructuring terms. Of these 18 companies, seven announced their restructurings around the 12-month mark. This includes four of the six companies from the ‘6-12 months’ category and three of the five companies from ‘more than 12 months’ category.
The other names in the ‘more than 12 months’ category include AMC Entertainment and Pfleiderer. They announced their restructurings significantly earlier, c.20 months ahead of their closest maturities. For AMC, the early action was likely prompted by the need to allow sufficient time to address its highly leveraged capital structure with net leverage at 9.0x as of March 2024. Pfleiderer’s early action was likely driven by Germany's stringent filing requirements which mandate a 12-month forward-looking solvency assessment.
This brings us to another interesting question: if most companies announced their restructuring within 12 months of their nearest maturity, how long did it take from advisors being appointed to heads of terms (or equivalent) being announced?
The median answer is around five to six months after advisors are first hired, highlighting how tight timelines often are once formal restructuring discussions begin. A similar timeline holds true for both maturity-triggered restructurings and liquidity-triggered restructurings, incidentally.
There are a few outliers. In maturity-triggered restructurings, Keter initially completed an A&E transaction in September 2023 to extend maturities but lenders ended up taking control in March 2024 after no buyer emerged.
OQ Chemicals (now OXEA) faced a similar rollercoaster. Its sponsor, OQ SAOC, suddenly withdrew its support for an A&E in April 2024, forcing lenders to extend the term loans and RCF maturities to December 2026 without a change in margin to provide more time for a sale. The company was given until February 2025 to find a buyer for OQ SAOC’s majority stake but by October 2024 with no successful sale, lenders were preparing to take over through a debt-for-equity swap.
Then there’s Groupe Casino, which was an entirely different beast. Its restructuring became a drawn-out saga, complicated by a massive debt burden, multiple stakeholders, and competing proposals, stretching far beyond the typical timeline.
Deals by type
For the purposes of this analysis, our definition of pro rata LMEs includes stressed A&Es, exchange deals, OpCo/HoldCo splits, and partial equitisation or reinstatement structures — generally where creditors are offered similar terms on a proportional basis. Non-pro rata LMEs include more aggressive strategies such as dropdowns, uptiers, and double dips, where certain creditor groups receive preferential treatment at the expense of others.
While we typically do not categorise court-administered or court-approved restructurings as LMEs, we make exceptions in cases where court involvement is minimal, and the transaction receives over 90% support from all affected creditor groups or classes.
Now, diving into the heart of the action — the deals that defined 2024.
We saw pro rata LMEs and control events dominate the landscape, with each accounting for 16 of the 43 deals. From a value perspective, control events stood out even more — contributing €34.1bn out of the total €78.5bn in completed deal value, nearly half of the total. Given both the volume and the scale of these transactions, it's fair to say that 2024 was the year of the control event. Control events include processes in which creditors or third parties assume control of the business (i.e. more than 50% equity) from the existing sponsors or owners.
LME pro rata
From a volume perspective, stressed A&Es led the way with eight deals within the LME pro rata category. However, when looking at deal value, stressed A&Es, exchange deals, and OpCo/HoldCo splits contributed evenly.
Stressed A&Es are more common in cap stacks with loans— five of eight stressed A&Es in 2024 involved issuers with loan exposure while the remaining three saw over 90% bondholder support. In contrast, exchange deals involve issuing a new instrument with a new ISIN are more prevalent in bond-heavy structures.
OpCo/HoldCo deals in 2024 reflect issuers returning a year post-restructuring to reduce OpCo debt because of excess leverage. This contrasts with the Opco/HoldCo deal announced by HSE24 in March 2025 in which the split was the first port of call rather than a follow-up fix.
Another interesting observation is that 12 out of the 16 deals in the LME pro rata category are maturity-triggered transactions. Drilling down a bit further, the trigger for stressed A&E and exchange deals is usually maturity. Of the 13 stressed A&Es and exchange deals, 11 involved a maturity trigger.
Of the 16 pro rata LME deals, 12 featured new money raised via debt or equity.
In one case (Atalian), cash was generated through the sale of a portion of the business to CD&R. Of the six stressed A&E transactions which featured a new money component, five involved new equity infusions to get the deal over the line. The exception was OQ Chemicals (now OXEA), where creditors provided €75m in priority debt and extended existing debt maturities after the sponsor declined further support. Concurrently, creditors initiated a sale process to facilitate full repayment, aiming for par recovery. However the sale process failed and creditors took control of the business in early April.
Of the five exchange deals, four involved a new money component while one — Veritas — did not.
On average new money — excluding the Ansaldo Energia deal — represented approximately 10% of pre-transaction gross debt.
Finally, on the implementation front, 12 deals out of 16 were implemented out-of-court, while four required court involvement. Notably, three stressed A&E transactions — Branicks, OQ Chemicals, and Tele Columbus - and one partial equitisation and reinstatement deal by Arvos Group were implemented in-court. All these deals achieved over 90% creditor consent.
Control events
15 of the 16 control events in 2024 involved a new money injection. The exception was Keter which faced distress due to an impending maturity wall. Creditors had already agreed to an A&E in 2023, which included a €50m facility for working capital. As a result, the 2024 creditor takeover did not involve additional new money.
Debt was clearly the preferred source of new money in control transactions, with 11 out of 15 deals securing fresh capital through new debt injections.
Of the 10 deals where new money was provided as priority debt or priority debt and equity, eight were funded by existing lenders, while the remaining two — AFE and Intu Group —received funding from third-party investors.
On average, new money — excluding the Enviva deal — represents approximately 20% of pre-gross debt.
Finally, on the implementation side, in-court processes emerged as the preferred route for control transactions, with 10 out of 16 deals executed through a formal court-approved process.
Implementation
23 deals were implemented out-of-court, while 20 required court involvement. As expected, the UK emerged as the most popular jurisdiction for in-court restructurings, accounting for 50% of all court-implemented deals.
Six of the 10 in-court restructurings implemented in the UK involved companies whose country of risk was outside the UK. However, the choice of the UK regime was primarily to pursue a cross-class cram-down as part of a Restructuring Plan.
Four of the six overseas companies that pursued UK in-court restructurings were German issuers—Aggregate Holdings, OQ Chemicals, PlusServer, and Tele Columbus. As more precedents are established under Germany’s StaRUG regime, which offers similar tools to the UK Restructuring Plan (including cross-class cram-down), German companies may increasingly opt for domestic solutions.
Apart from UK-based processes, most companies have opted for in-court restructuring solutions in their home jurisdictions. The only exception is Sweden-based SAS Group which used Chapter 11 in the US.